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THE EUROPEAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
CONFERENCE: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 
George A. Bermann* 
Peter Herzog's career-long interest in the European Communities 
makes it especially appropriate to include in this festschrift a contribu-
tion on what has become the principal mechanism for reforming the 
treaties that constitute those Communities. I refer of course to the "in-
tergovernmental conferences," or "IGCs" for short. As this festschrift 
goes to press, the fifteen Member States are submitting the results of the 
latest IGC-the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam1-to their respective na-
tional ratification processes. 
As its name suggests, the intergovernmental conference is a gather-
ing of representatives of the Member States to discuss and eventually 
agree upon amendments to the constitutive treaties as they then stand. 
The EC Treaty, by its own terms, requires that all treaty amendments be 
prepared by such an intergovernmental conference and be submitted to 
the Member States for their separate ratification,2 and the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union (the TEU or Maastricht Treaty) contains a parallel provi-
sion. 3 In point of fact, the recent Amsterdam Treaty is little more than a 
set of amendments to the EC Treaty and the TEU. 
Recent intergovernmental conferences have been followed with in-
tense interest in European circles, as indeed they should be, for they 
represent a kind of periodic constitutional convention. At a minimum, 
they are the means by which the Member States adapt the treaties that 
constitute the European Communities, and now the European Union as 
well, to the needs of the future. 
Depending on its programmatic content, a European IGC can also 
generate considerable political and economic interest abroad. The IGC 
that led up to adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 (including 
certain amendments to the then-EEC Treaty) was dominated by a legis-
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1. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing 
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [herein-
after Treaty of Amsterdam]. 
2. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY art. 236, 1992 0.J. (C 224) 1, [1992) 
1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
3. TREATY ON EuROPEAN UNION art. N, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, [1992) 1 
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter TEU]. The TEU, in addition to introducing amendments to the EC 
TREATY and the other Community treaties, established a European Union (of which the EC was to 
form a part) and authorized the conduct of important intergovernmental activities (notably in the 
foreign and security policy area and in justice and home affairs) in the name of the EU. 
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lative program for completion of the so-called internal market; it accord-
ingly generated fears in the United States of a "fortress Europe." The 
IGCs that in tum produced the Maastricht Treaty dealt in large measure 
with a blueprint for the construction of an economic and monetary union 
(EMU), consisting of a single currency and a system of central banks 
authorized to determine macro-economic policies for most if not all of 
the EU' s Member States; the prospect of an EMU likewise entailed a 
certain threat to American interests and accordingly earned serious at-
tention in this country. But, as the most recent conference demonstrates, 
IGCs do not necessarily have so strongly political a transatlantic dimen-
sion. While the EU' s eastern enlargement, which cast a long shadow 
over the 1996 IGC, will obviously have repercussions outside Europe, 
the latest IGC was viewed very largely as a "European" affair. 
Whatever their significance for the transatlantic relationship may 
be, the European IGCs invariably also hold interest from a comparative 
constitutional law perspective. Judged in these terms, the IGC is a 
highly curious phenomenon. This article seeks to sketch what appear to 
be the most salient characteristics of the intergovernmental conference 
as a general instrument of constitutional reform. In so doing, it also 
examines the fruits of the latest intergovernmental conference-the IGC 
that opened in Turin, Italy, in March 1996 and culminated in the Am-
sterdam Treaty of 1997. Finally, it implies some of the ways in which 
the intergovernmental conference, as a vehicle for constitutional reform, 
might in the future be made better adapted to its task. 
By their very nature, the IGCs serve as constant reminders that, 
however "constitutive" of supranational entities the constitutive treaties 
may be, they are still in their origin nothing but treaties. As a result, 
when the time comes to modify the ground rules by which the suprana-
tional institutions operate, the Member States return to the source: the 
making of international treaties among sovereign states. This will ex-
plain many of the characteristic features of the IGCs, starting with the 
very secrecy with which they proceed. 
I. SECRECY 
Though contemporary constitutional reform ordinarily takes place 
in the light (or relative light) of day, this is unlikely to be so in the case 
of constitutional reform conducted through international agreement. 
Admittedly, the IGCs no longer proceed with quite as much secrecy as 
they have in the past. This is due largely to the important role in the 
IGCs played by the supranational institutions themselves, as opposed to 
the Member States. At the 1996 IGC, certain of the institutions (the 
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Commission, the Parliament and the Court, in particular) had a fairly 
strong interest in defining both the issues before the IGC and their insti-
tutional positions on those issues. 
Ultimately, however, the Member States themselves have the deci-
sive voice; that is the nature of an IGC, however much the institutions 
may have been called upon to help prepare it. In the last IGC, as in 
those that preceded it, the Member States refrained from making their 
initial positions on the issues publicly known; much less did they make 
known the extent to which they might be willing to make concessions on 
some issues in order to achieve the results they sought on other issues. 
To the extent that the IGC is a treaty negotiation among States with 
potentially conflicting interests, it is hardly surprising that Member 
States keep their proverbial "cards" to their "chest" until the waning 
hours of the conference. But it is, at the same time, not particularly 
conducive to good constitution-making. 
II. SCOPE 
The use of intergovernmental conferences for amending the consti-
tutive treaties also has implications for the sheer scope of debate. By 
definition, an IGC may have on its agenda any matter that could plausi-
bly occasion an amendment to, or an extension of, any of the constitu-
tive treaties among the Member States. To be sure, the latest IGC had 
the benefit of a report by a Reflection Group whose purpose was pre-
cisely to focus attention on the most pressing questions, and that report 
in tum was informed by focused reports prepared by each of the differ-
ent EU institutions. The fact remains that the Member States were able 
to, and did, place on the IGC agenda any and all items that they deemed 
desirable to address through treaty amendment. This makes for a con-
ference of practically limitless possibilities. 
The failure to delineate the issues before an IGC presents the par-
ticipants with a number of problems. First, it raises a problem of re-
sources, since participants simply cannot muster the energies that due 
attention to all the potential and actual agenda items requires. Second, it 
raises a problem of expectations, since it generates unrealistic ambitions 
about the scope and scale of constitutional reform that can reasonably be 
expected to emerge at the end of the IGC. The problem of expectations 
affects not only the IGC participants, but the public more broadly. Fi-
nally, the notion that virtually everything is negotiable or re-negotiable 
at an intergovernmental conference creates a problem of impermanence. 
Although this is largely a problem of appearances, it is a problem none-
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theless, for it fosters the idea that nothing (repeated references to the 
acquis communautaire notwithstanding) is fixed and durable. 
In each of these respects, a comparison with constitutional amend-
ment in the United States, while not entirely fair, is nevertheless re-
vealing. Among the reasons why the constitutional amendment process 
in the U.S. is so manageable is that debates leading to amendments are 
invariably based upon a precise and focused text relating to one or more 
discrete public issues. Thus, by their nature, amendment proposals raise 
neither the resource, expectations nor impermanence problems that at-
tend the EU' s intergovernmental conferences. To put the matter differ-
ently, Member States truly approach the IGCs more as if they were 
periodic constitutional conventions than occasions for successive consti-
tutional amendments, and doing so exacts a price. 
Consequently, at the end of the day, IGCs have tended to produce 
widely disparate sets of treaty amendments, some elements of which 
doubtless deserved fuller and more public debate than, under the circum-
stances, they could possibly receive. The 1996 IGC was no exception. 
Alongside some fairly technical changes (e.g., alteration of the final step 
in the parliamentary co-decision procedure for legislation4 ) and the addi-
tion of some uncontroversial substantive chapters (e.g., the new chapter 
on unemployment5), the Amsterdam Treaty contains some breathtak-
ingly important and innovative material. Despite their rather innocuous 
title, for example, the new provisions for "enhanced cooperation"6 open 
up dramatic possibilities for a "two-or-more-speed" Europe and all that 
that entails. So, too, do the new procedures by which Member States 
may be sanctioned for committing persistent breaches of fundamental 
Community law principles.7 
It may be that the time has arrived for the European Union to con-
vene intergovernmental conferences around a smaller number of reason-
ably well-defined issues-preferably with a specific text dealing with 
those issues, and only those issues, on the table. This is one way in 
which they might better overcome the resources, expectations and im-
permanence problems that they have generated. It is also a way in 
which the States and institutions might ensure that reforms on the table 
(particularly those ultimately adopted) receive the careful consideration 
they deserve. 
4. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, amending EC TREATY, art. 189b. 
5. Id., adding a new Title Via to the EC TREATY, consisting of arts. 109n-109s, (on 
employment). 
6. Id., adding a new Title Via, arts. K.15-K.17, to the TEU, and a new art. 5a to the EC 
TREATY. 
7. Id., adding art. F.1 to the TEU. 
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Ill. INSTITUTIONAL EMPHASIS 
At the same time, amending the constitutive treaties by intergovern-
mental conference would seem to risk giving political issues undue pri-
ority, at the expense of basic institutional questions. Certainly, in the 
U.S. experience, constitutional debates and documents have had a dis-
tinctly institutional focus. Not surprisingly for a product of its age, the 
U.S. Constitution is in fact heavily institutional in orientation, and sub-
sequent amendments (even the Bill of Rights notwithstanding) have not 
fundamentally altered that. U.S. constitutionalism proceeds very largely 
on the belief that what is essential about constitutional government is 
basic confidence in the institutions in whose hands political decisions 
will inevitably come to rest, and confidence in the processes by which 
those institutions go about their business. 
In fact, the risk that I have identified does not seem as such to have 
materialized in the EU setting. Every recent IGC has had a major insti-
tutional dimension, with the result that the treaty amendments that fol-
lowed have themselves had an important institutional component. Once 
again, the 1996 IGC is no exception. Its consolidation of the EC legisla-
tive process into a fairly unitary one, based upon the principles of parlia-
mentary co-decision,8 is a good example. Not only is this consolidation 
desirable from the point of view of procedural simplicity and trans-
parency, but it goes a long way to removing incentives for the institu-
tions themselves to manipulate the "legal basis" on which measures are 
proposed and adopted, or for Member States to mount judicial chal-
lenges to the "legal basis" of the measure that is ultimately enacted.9 
Although the intergovernmental character of the amendment pro-
cess has not in fact diverted institutional issues from the IGC agenda, it 
can nevertheless affect the way in which those issues are treated. There 
is no other way to explain the failure of the 1996 IGC to resolve such 
obviously pressing institutional questions as the size and composition of 
the European Commission after enlargement, or the re-weighting of 
votes in qualified majority decisionmaking. These issues go to the heart 
of the EC legislative process, and appeared to be ones that the IGC sim-
ply could not fail to resolve-as it in fact did. 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE LAW GROWTH 
Intergovernmental conferences have varied widely in the extent to 
which they considered adding new substantive chapters to the constitu-
8. Id., amending various articles of the EC TREATY. 
9. See generally, GEORGE A. BERMANN, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY LAW 84-90 (1993). 
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tive treaties, and thus new competences to the European Union. The 
1996 IGC distinguished itself from immediately prior ones by adding 
only lightly to the existing competences. While earlier treaty amend-
ments had given the institutions new legislative powers over environ-
mental policy, occupational safety and health, consumer protection, 
social policy, education, vocational training, and culture-among many 
other subjects10-the Amsterdam Treaty only added employment to the 
competences of the Union. 11 
This slowdown in the expansion of European Community compe-
tences is to be welcomed. Looking at the treaties as they stand, there is 
certainly nothing conspicuously absent from the substantive chapters of 
the treaties that cannot be adequately explained or justified. In any case, 
Articles 1 OOa and 235 of the EC Treaty give the institutions ample 
means for filling any major gaps. Moreover, any further proliferation of 
separate chapters risks impairing the unity and coherence of which the 
treaties have such evident need. 
Quite apart from any commitment to the principle of subsidiarity, 12 
I believe that the European Union would do well to demonstrate that 
constitutional progress does not necessitate the expansion of the Union's 
legislative jurisdiction. Aside from the fact that expansion is not neces-
sarily progress, it is unrealistic, and ultimately unhealthy, to expect that 
every few years and every successive IGC will bring in their wake a 
conspicuous subject matter expansion of the EU. Thus, the Amsterdam 
Treaty has the merit of not adding substantially to the Union's existing 
competences and of showing that an IGC does not have to add new 
substantive chapters to the treaties, or else be counted as a failure. A 
consolidation of gains is every bit as worthy a constitutional project as 
an extension of the outer bounds of legislative competence. Not to de-
rive that lesson from this IGC will set the Member States and institu-
tions up for inevitable disappointment in the years ahead. 
10. These chapters were largely added to the EC Treaty by provisions of the Single Euro-
pean Act, Jun. 29, 1987, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA] and the 
TEU. 
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
12. EC TREATY art. 3b. "In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and 
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
Community." Id. 
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V. UNFINISHED BUSINESS 
If a perpetual extension of power is neither necessary nor even 
good for the European Union, progress of another kind is very much in 
order. If we look back on the last forty years, and the last several IGCs, 
we cannot help but observe that certain basic and quite "constitutional" 
achievements within the grasp of the European Union still remain to be 
made. These omissions are all the more striking in light of the substan-
tial efforts that were made in the run up to the 1996 IGC to ensure that 
these very achievements did not remain undone. 
While a respectable constitution can certainly fail to deal with ques-
tions such as the "legal personality" of the political entity and "the hier-
archy of legal norms" (note that the U.S. Constitution largely fails to do 
so in both respects), these issues figured prominently in discussions 
leading up to the 1996 IGC, and legal scholars had invested considerable 
effort in their resolution. The silence of the Amsterdam Treaty on these 
scores is, to that extent, cause for disappointment. 
But if constitutional resolution of these issues can be considered 
something of a luxury, the resolution of other such issues cannot. Yet 
they, too, remain unaddressed. Of these, let me mention two. 
The first is the issue of the so-called simplification and consolida-
tion of the treaties. By any standard, the constitutive treaties are a com-
plicated set of texts, both in the way in which they relate to one another 
and in their own terms. Judged by the standards of a constitution (which 
they admittedly are not), they simply do not measure up. It is difficult to 
believe that the European Union would not be strengthened, at least in 
the eyes of the public in whose interest it was established and on whose 
allegiance it depends, if the treaties constituting the Communities and 
the Union were made architecturally simpler and substantively more co-
herent. In at least this respect, they could readily stand to be "constitu-
tionalized". It is certainly not the case that inadequate preparatory work 
had been done on this front. 
Still more conspicuous in its absence from the constitutive treaties 
is a straightforward expression of fundamental human rights. Observers 
of Community law are only too aware of the efforts the Court of Justice 
has made through its case law to fill the gap in individual rights protec-
tions; it has found support for these efforts in the European Human 
Rights Convention (to which every Member State is currently a party) 
and in the common "constitutional traditions" of the Member States 
themselves.13 But, in light of the Union's far-reaching legal powers, 
13. See generally BERMANN, ET AL., supra note 9, at 142-49. 
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inclusion of a human rights charter in the body of the constitutive trea-
ties themselves is by no means too much to expect, and would in fact go 
far toward strengthening the Union's political legitimacy. Despite de-
mands by the Parliament, the support of the Commission and urgings by 
a number of Member States, this too-after several comprehensive 
IGCs-remains undone. 14 
With respect to issues of this order-legal personality, hierarchy of 
legal norms, simplification and consolidation, and human rights-it may 
be less important how they are handled than that they are handled, once 
and for all. These are not issues that a mature legal system should 
chronically revisit, IGC after IGC. At some point surely arrived at by 
now, they should be taken out of the political arena and become more or 
less constitutionally resolved. 
Although it would clearly be appropriate to have addressed these 
issues constitutionally by now, the drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty 
chose instead to address constitutionally once again the issue of sub-
sidiarity. A special protocol to the treaty records the Member States' 
understanding of what the subsidiarity principle means and how, at least 
in some ways, it is to be enforced. 15 However, even a cursory examina-
tion of the protocol will show that the drafters thereby added little to our 
understanding of either the meaning or workings of subsidiarity. Nor is 
it realistic to suppose that the drafters could have done much better than 
they did. One can only conclude that, however little clarity in under-
standing subsidiarity this exercise has brought, it was considered politi-
cally indispensable in many, if not most, of the Member States. In this, 
too, we observe the powerful effects of intergovemmentalism in the con-
stitutional reform of the European Union. 
The Member States do not need to abandon the intergovernmental 
conference as the favored mechanism of constitutional reform at the Eu-
ropean level. But they do have some choice as to quantity and quality of 
matters for discussion, as to the degree of focus, as to the ways in which 
the conference is prepared and conducted, and as to the emphasis to be 
given to the various issues competing for attention. The choices made 
will depend not only the effectiveness of the individual IGCs and their 
treaty results, but also the legitimacy and public standing of the entire 
enterprise. 
14. According to a recent judicial opinion of the Court of Justice, even accession of the 
European Union to the European Human Rights Convention would require an amendment of the 
EC Treaty and the other constitutive treaties. See In re the Accession of the Community to the 
European Human Rights Convention, Opinion 2/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996). 
15. Protocol (to the Treaty of Amsterdam) on the Application of the Principles of Sub-
sidiarity and Proportionality. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1. 
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